I think this will turn out to be the key point. The issue with Phantom Secure appears to be that the product was specifically marketed for and supplied to so-called “organised crime” figures and explicitly to facilitate the conduct of criminal enterprises. In the United States that would then make the Phantom Secure business subject to a RICO case as the service and product facilitated a criminal conspiracy.
The circumstantial, but more immediate, proof that it has more to do with that than the specific technology and software used to create the device, particularly the “PGP encryption” component is right here. Specifically I am that proof: I’m a co-founder of CryptoParty and a current GNU Privacy Guard developer, I also live in Australia. Yet the AFP haven’t so much as twitched in my direction in regards to this. Why? Arguably my involvement in helping to develop the most popular and widespread implementation of the OpenPGP standard in the world would have greater reach than a few thousand Phantom Secure phones.
Well, the answer is pretty obvious. My work, along with the work of Werner, Niibe and others, does not explicitly focus on facilitating organised crime. It could be used by criminals, but no more or less than it could be used by any other group in society; including political groups, activists, human rights NGOs, journalists, domestic abuse survivors, minorities and even law enforcement, surveillance agencies or defence forces themselves. Not only that, but all of these types of groups (and more) do use it.